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Language and language : Approaches to
metaphor
John Stewart
« There’s glory for you ! » said Humpty Dumpty.
« I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory’, » Alice
said.
Humpty smiled contemptuously. « Of course you
don’t – till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-
down argument for you!’ »
« But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down
argument,’ » Alice objected.
« When I use a word, Humpty said in a rather
scornful tone, « it means just what I choose it to
mean – neither more nor less. »
« The question is, said Alice, whether you can make
words mean so many different things. »
« The question is, said Humpty, which is to be




1 English speakers have some difficulty in appreciating the difference between « language »
and « language ». With good reason, one might be tempted to say. The point, however, is
that  in  French  there  are  two  words  –  « langue » and  « langage »  –  which  do  not
necessarily have the same meaning. The work of Pierre-Yves Raccah is characterized by
great  precision  and rigour;  and here  we  have  a  case  in  point.  He  has  established a
terminology in which “langue” refers to a natural language, such as French or English;
whereas “langage” refers to a formal language, the language of logic. Statements in a
natural language are generally “phrases”, which means that their interpretation is always
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up for negotiation, and will depend heavily on the contextual situation. Statements in a
formal language, by contrast, which take the form of logical propositions, have at least
the appearance1 of having a unique interpretation which is context-free.
2 Pierre-Yves Raccah has put this important distinction to good use in an article which I
will take as the focal point of this paper: A non paradoxical conception of metaphor, based on a
non metaphorical conception of paradox (Raccah 2011). In this article, Raccah clearly states
three objectives, which may at first sight seem to be not only difficult to accept, but
which may also appear disconnected. There are thus actually four objectives; since to the
first three there must be added the objective of showing that they are indeed connected.
Thus, Raccah proposes:
▪ to defend and to illustrate the idea according to which the presence of a paradox
in a reasoning indicates a dimensional flattening, in other words that there is a failure
to take into account an essential conceptual difference, in one of the steps in the
reasoning;
▪  to  show  that  the  usual  conception  of  the  notion  of  metaphor  engenders  a
paradox: he will conclude that it rests on a confusion;
▪  to  propose  a  way  of  conceiving  the  notion  of  metaphor,  which  avoids  this
paradox  by  taking  seriously  distinctions  which  are  overlooked  in  the  classical
conception: he will conclude that there is no linguistic conception of metaphor;
▪ to present theoretical tools which make it possible to integrate this conception of
metaphor in a descriptive semantics sufficiently rigorous to avoid such dimensional
flattening:  he will  conclude that the first  three objectives are actually intimately
connected.
3 We can thus see that Raccah is precise and rigorous, not only at the level of terminology,
but also at the level of the construction of his argument. However, in this paper I shall not
attempt to follow through the argument presented by Raccah in all its details; and this,
for two reasons. Firstly, to do so would be (at best) to repeat what Raccah has himself so
clearly expressed. The second reason is that I myself have some difficulty in following
through the thread of the argument; although I agree with what I understand of the gist
of it,  I  get a bit lost in some of the details.  This is surely due essentially to my own
limitations; for cultural reasons, related to my pragmatic Anglo-Saxon background, I am
not at ease beyond a certain level of abstraction. What I therefore propose to do, is to
express in my own words what I understand as Raccah’s principle conclusion; and then to
present a complementary approach, based on the paradigm of Enaction, which as I see it
leads essentially to the same conclusion (section 2). Finally, in section 3, I propose to
address a new question which (as it seems to me) arises for both approaches.
 
1. An alternative approach to metaphor
4 I  take it that the principle conclusion of Raccah’s argument is this:  “metaphor”, as a
linguistic conception,  does not exist.  The reason for this  is  that in natural  language,
everything is metaphor; and because of this, nothing (in particular) is metaphor. How does
the paradigm of Enaction approach this question?
5 The paradigm of Enaction is a newcomer on the stage of Cognitive Science; its ambition is
neither more nor less than to rival with the traditional “Computational Theory of Mind” –
TCM – (and its neo-connexionist variants) as a possible framework for addressing the
question of cognition as a whole. One of the very real merits of the CTM is that it offers a
genuinely transdisciplinary approach, crossing the barriers of psychology, neuroscience
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and  linguistics;  it  does  this  by  taking  “the  computer”  as  a  basic  metaphor  (?!)  for
cognition in general.  The paradigm of Enaction must therefore do at least as well;  it
achieves its own form of transdisciplinarity by taking an alternative metaphor, that of
living  organisms,  as  its  basis.  The  research programme of  Enaction then consists  of
following through, step by step, the evolutionary path that leads from the origin of life
right up to the present day. Beyond these liminary remarks, it is not my intention here to
present the paradigm of Enaction; for this, interested readers are referred to Maturana
and Varela (1980), Varela et alii (1991) and Stewart et alii (2010). Here, I will focus on just
two  steps  that  are  particularly  relevant  for  our  question  concerning  language  and
metaphor.
6 The first  of  these steps occurred quite early in evolution:  it  may be dubbed “animal
communication”. This is defined as a situation where certain environmental conditions
trigger the emission of a signal; the perception of this signal by another animal modulates
the actions of the receiver; and the combination of the particular conditions which
trigger  the  emission  of  the  signal,  the  particular  actions  taken,  and  the  ecological
situation leads  to  a  co-ordination  of  actions that  improves  the viability  of  the animals
concerned (Maturana and Varela 1980). Several points may be noted here. Firstly, the
material nature of the signal is quite irrelevant; all that counts is the dynamics that are
engendered. Linguists make a big point about the “arbitrary” nature of semiotic signals;
but  although as  we shall  see there are major  qualitative differences  between animal
communication and human language, the arbitrary nature of the sign is not among them.
Secondly,  the  animals  concerned do  not  have  any intention to  communicate;  the  co-
ordination of actions occurs effectively even though the animals have no understanding
of what they are doing. This can be illustrated by experimental  modifications of  the
situation such that the emission and perception of the signals no longer serves any useful
purpose;  in this  case,  even relatively evolved animals such as vervet  monkeys go on
producing their signals and behavioural reactions “as usual”, and simply do not notice
that anything is amiss. It is fair to conclude that in the case of “animal communication”,
both the emission of signals and the behavioural reactions are highly stereotyped reactions
common to  all  normal  members  of  the  species;  as  such,  they  can  perfectly  well  be
explained by natural selection, and do not involve any “understanding” or “intention to
communicate”. 
7 The second step is the emergence of language in the full sense of the term; this occurred
much later, as a key element in the process of hominisation. By contrast with animal
communication, human language is dramatically not stereotyped. Firstly, because of the
combinatorial  mechanisms  at  work  (phonemes  or  letters  into  words,  words  into
sentences),  the number of  different “signals” is  stupendous.  The number of different 
semantic meanings is even greater. Considering the word as a unit, the meaning of a word
can vary according to its linguistic context (the neighbouring words with which it is
combined)  and  even  more  according to  its pragmatic context.  Taking  this  into  due
account, one could seriously put forward the hypothesis that no word has ever been used
twice to mean exactly the same thing.
8 This, however, immediately raises a problem. Animal communication functions (without
understanding) because it is stereotyped. If human language is not stereotyped, how do
human beings ever communicate correctly by talking? A part of the answer is that in
general we probably understand each other far less than we fondly imagine. Garfinkel
(1967) has impishly pointed out that in the course of normal conversation, the socially
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acceptable thing to do is to accept to have only a very vague and imperfect understanding
of what is actually being said, and riding the wave of good faith that things will become
“sufficiently clear” as we go along. Arguably, some of the most significant moments of
communication occur when speakers identify a misunderstanding; paradoxical though it
may seem, what happens is that they then realize that up until that point, they had been
misinterpreting each other (with the best of intentions, of course). My point here is not
nihilistic; I am not saying that we do not understand each other at all, only that our
understanding is not, and cannot be, “100% perfect” (as the “information-transfer” model
dear to the Computational Theory of Mind would suggest is possible). 
9 If  we  accept  that  a  verbal  utterance  radically  underdetermines the  meaning  to  be
communicated,  how can  some  degree  of  communication  nevertheless  occur?  This  is
where the intention to communicate comes in. Firstly, the hearer puts great creativity into
inventing, imagining, guessing what the speaker might be trying to say. Of course, this is
(at  best)  a  hypothesis;  the communication can only be consolidated if  there is  some
feedback. This is why such phrases as: “Do you mean that….” (followed by a paraphrase);
or “I don’t understand what you mean at all, please say it again”; or (sometimes) “Yes,
yes, I see, go on…” are so common in ordinary conversation. It is to be noted that these
meta-linguistic messages – absolutely vital for linguistic inter-comprehension, on this
account – are often replaced by facial gestures and mimics: a frown, a deliberate silence, a
nod of the head, winking the eyes, and so on. Such gestures are not usually counted as
“linguistic” (they are not words); but if this theory is right, such meta-linguistic signals
are  actually at  the  core  of  what  is  characteristically  linguistic.  Thus,  linguistic
communication  is  governed  by  a  (mutual)  intention to  communicate.  It  is  thus,
theoretically,  a second order communication about the status of  the first-level  inter-
comprehension. This discursive elaboration is meant to put some flesh on the rather dry
definition of a “linguistic domain” by Maturana and Varela (1980): language is a second-
order meta-communication, a co-ordination of co-ordination of actions. 
10 Having thus sketched out a theory of language as it appears in the paradigm of Enaction,
we can now return to the question of metaphor. Hopefully it will not be necessary to
labour the point. If the meaning of a word is never unambiguously pre-defined, but is
always up for redefinition and negotiation; if a word can always mean “just what one
chooses it to mean, neither more nor less”; then although not all speakers may constantly
go to the length of Humpty Dumpty, it follows that “metaphor” is not the exception but
the rule. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Lakoff (1987) have said, “all is metaphor”. But
if indeed “all is metaphor”; if “metaphor” is not a peculiar figure of speech, but simply
the norm, then it does not call for any particular explanation or construal; and in this
sense, as Raccah (2011) points out, it does not exist. 
 
2. A return to literal sense
11 Now if “metaphor” as a particular figure of speech does not exist, we come to rather
unexpected question:  what  about  literal  sense?!  The conventional  view is  that  “literal
sense” is the norm which does not require any particular explanation, and “metaphor”
the peculiar figure of speech which does call for elucidation. If we turn this on its head, as
we propose doing here, and consider that “metaphor” is the norm which does not require
explanation,  then there is  still  something we do have to explain:  and this  is  “literal
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sense”, or at any rate the appearance of “literal sense” (hence the scare-quotes around
“literal”).
12 An analogy may help us here. In the field of Science (or more precisely, in epistemology),
it is usual to consider that “objective reality” exists and is what it is (independently of
anything that may or may not be known about it); and that “true scientific facts” are
neither more nor less than faithful representations of this reality. However Latour and
Woolgar (1979), based on careful observation of what actually goes on in a real scientific
laboratory over a period of time, have provided a somewhat different account. They note
that  during  the  period  when  scientific  knowledge  is  actually  being  generated,  all
scientific  statements  start  their  career  as  hypotheses;  at  this  stage,  the  scientists
themselves clearly recognize that  these hypotheses spring from their  own subjective
imagination (to anticipate, this would seem to be indeed of the same order as the creative
imagination deployed by the partners in a conversation trying to imagine what the other
person might be trying to express). Coming back to the scientific laboratory, the majority
of these hypotheses are abandoned: sometimes rapidly, if a new experiment refutes them
definitively; more often, they die a slow and lingering death simply because no-one finds
it worthwhile to conduct experiments designed to test them. However in a rather small
majority of cases, the hypothesis stays around, and even prospers if it successfully avoids
refutation  in  a  sufficient  number  of  well-publicized  experiments  where  it  made
surprising predictions. If  a consensus forms in the relevant scientific community, the
"factual" status of a statement stabilizes; and if this lasts for a sufficient time, then two
remarkable  processes  called  "splitting"  and  "inversion"  occur.  Firstly,  the  statement
"splits" into two, and sends a copy of itself into "the real world out there". If one can
catch the process at this critical point (which is difficult, since it usually only lasts a short
time), the relation between the hypothetical statement and the copy is startlingly clear:
since it is rigorously impossible to say anything about the “real object out there” that is
not  just  repeating  the  terms of  the  statement,  the  “object”  is  nothing other  than a
derivative carbon-copy of the initial statement. However, very rapidly (so rapidly, indeed,
that the sleight of hand generally escapes notice), a second event occurs: the relation
between the statement and the "copy" is inverted so that the statement is presented,
rhetorically, as the "copy" of the "real object out there". Thus, scientific facts have the
peculiar  property  that  the  final  stages  of  their  construction  consist  of  creating  a
"referential impression" which belies their own nature as social constructions; and the
adequatio rei et intellectus between object and statement becomes a miraculous matter for
philosophical  wonderment.  The  sad  truth  is,  of  course,  that  this  marvelous
“correspondence” derives quite simply from the fact that during its genesis, the "real
object out there" first arose as a perfect carbon-copy of the scientific statement. If anyone
should doubt Latour and Woolgar’s account, it is interesting to observe what happens
when, as is sometimes the case, a later experiment does refute the hypothesis. Any self-
respecting  “real  object”  would  not  take  this  lying  down,  and would  stubbornly  stay
around (after all, it is in its very nature to be “above” the doings of mere mortal men); but
what  actually  happens  in  practice  is  that  it  dutifully  and  discreetly  fades  back  into
oblivion.
13 Returning to our question of “literal meanings”, it may be that something of the same
sort is going on. To harp on our main point: in the course of natural language discourse,
all the  words  are  “metaphors”  in  the  sense  that  they  have  no  unique,  pre-defined
meaning; the meaning is “up for grabs” each time, and calls for active interpretation (and
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guessing,  and  negotiation).  An  appearance of  “literal  meaning”  will  arise  when  the
situation becomes stereotyped (ironically, this is not really an advance, but rather a retreat
to the situation of “animal communication” as we have characterized it above). It is in
such circumstances that the word in question will project a “double” of itself out into
some “pre-defined” zone of absolute meaning; and then an operation of “inversion” will
make it seem that the word “refers” to this stable meaning. Another way of saying this is
that the word becomes a “dead metaphor”. Fortunately, this is never the end of the story;
because  a  “dead  metaphor”  can  always  come  to  life  again  if  one  departs  from  the
stereotype and audaciously gives it a new meaning. This is not quite as hard as it may
seem; we don’t need to have the impudent insolence of Humpty Dumpty; in practice, we
do it all the time without even noticing…
14 In conclusion, language may be at its best when we are half-way between a metaphor and
a literal meaning. As Raccah (2013) has remarked, with his usual perspicacity, a good
metaphor is like a good joke: totally unexpected when you first come across it – but
obvious once you have seen it.
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NOTES
1. I  say they have the « appearance » of being context-free, because actually they themselves
function  in  what  is  a  very  particular  context,  the  one  that  has  been  formally  set  up  by  a
community of logicians…
RÉSUMÉS
Des  Anglophones  peuvent  éprouver  quelques  difficultés  à  comprendre  la  différence  entre
« langue » et « langage », car en anglais il existe un seul mot pour les deux, à savoir « language ».
L’œuvre de Pierre-Yves Raccah est caractérisé par une très grande précision et rigueur ; cela est
bien illustré par la terminologie qu’il a établi selon laquelle le terme « langue » correspond à une
langue naturelle comme le Français ou l’Anglais ;  alors que le terme « langage » renvoie à un
langage  formel,  le  langage  de  la  logique.  Les  énoncés  dans  une  langue  naturelle  sont
généralement  des  « phrases »,  ce  qui signifie  que  leur  interprétation  appelle  toujours  une
négociation et dépend fortement de la situation contextuelle. Par contre, les énoncés dans un
langage formel prennent la forme de propositions logiques,  qui  possèdent apparemment une
seule interprétation – quoique, il convient de le préciser, cette apparence dépend en réalité d’un
contexte bien particulier, celui qui est établi par la communauté des logiciens.
Raccah (2011) a déployé cette distinction importante dans un article qui constitue le point focal
de cette contribution. Raccah y présente un argument bien structuré, qui le conduit à conclure
que « la métaphore n’existe pas ». La raison est que dans les langues naturelles, tous les mots
sont normalement des métaphores ; il s’ensuit que « la métaphore », comme trope particulier qui
appelle  une  explication,  n’existe  effectivement  pas.  Dans  ma  contribution,  je  propose  de
présenter une approche complémentaire, prenant comme cadre le paradigme de l’Énaction en
Sciences Cognitives, qui conduit à une conclusion sensiblement identique. Finalement, je propose
de  formuler  une  nouvelle  question  qui  se  pose  si  l’on  considère  que  « la  métaphore »  est
normale ;  il  s’agit  du  statut  des  « énoncés  littéraux »  qui,  par  une  ironie  du  sort  suite  au
renversement de la situation, deviennent à leur tour problématiques. 
The  work  of  Pierre-Yves  Raccah  is  characterized  by  great  precision  and  rigour;  this  is  well
illustrated by the terminological distinction he has established between natural language (such as
French or English), and formal language as employed by logicians. The statements in a natural
language are generally “phrases”, which means that their interpretation is always a matter for
negotiation and depends strongly on the contextual situation. By contrast, the statements in a
formal language take the form of logical propositions, which apparently possess only a single
interpretation – although, it may be pointed out, this appearance actually depends on a very
particular  context,  that  constructed  by  the  community  of  logicians.  This  distinction  can  be
difficult  for  English-speaking  persons  to  grasp,  because  in  English  there  is  only  one  word –
“language” – whereas in French there are two, “langue” and “langage”.
Raccah (2011) has deployed this important distinction in an important article which constitutes
the focal point of this contribution. Raccah presents a precisely structured argument to the effect
that “metaphors do not exist”. The reason is that in natural language, all the words are normally 
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metaphors;  it  follows  that  a  “metaphor”,  as  a  distinctive  figure  of  speech  which  calls  for
explanation, does indeed not exist. In my contribution, I propose to present a complementary
approach, taking as framework the paradigm of Enaction in Cognitive Science, which comes to
essentially the same conclusion. Finally, I propose to formulate a new question which arises if
one  considers  that  “metaphors”  are  normal:  this  concerns  the  status  of  “literal  statements”
which,  by  an  irony  of  fate  consequent  on  a  reversal  of  the  situation,  become  in  their  turn
problematical.
INDEX
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